At first I thought Ryle's distinguishment between laws (which are correct hypothetical statements) and statements of fact is similar to Wittgenstein's distinguishment between logical statements and statements of fact. But then Wittgenstein (the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus that is, I haven't read enough of Philosophical Investigations to speculate on his later opinions) would probably construe both laws and statements of fact as pictures of the world. If they're both pictures then in a sense they are both making a statement about the world. I'm not sure that there's such a fundamental difference as Ryle wants to make out. Sure, one is explicitly extended in time (in that it requires observation of a sequence of events), but I'm not sure that statements of fact are not. If one asks how one confirms statements of facts, is it not a similar "if… then" of the form "if you observe/acquaint yourself with [] in a certain manner, then you will get [] results"? If you want to say, like Ryle does, that laws do not exist as things apart from the hypothetical happenings they describe, then isn't it also possible to say that facts do not exist as things apart from the sequences of observation and confirmation that they describe?

 Ed: Of course, in the Tractatus logical statements are fundamentally different from natural laws, so I was talking out of my arse.