I have only just realised that Hartle and Srednicki’s recent paper could be considered a refutation of the doomsday argument, which seems to rely on an assumption that we are typical. My first thought upon that realisation was that some philosopher has probably already said at least a large part of what Hartle and Srednicki said. I was right. Here’s one example:
In order for a statistical model to tell us about the parameter of a real population, the model must fit the inferential facts of the matter about that real population. The tank model arguably does not fit the facts of the real problem. In particular, if we reject the fairy story above and accept some variety of materialism, the notion that anyone is uniformly randomly selected from among the total population of the species is beyond far fetched. The bodies that we are, or supervene upon, have a nearly fixed position in the evolutionary order; for example, given what we know of evolution it is silly to suppose that someone’s DNA could precede that of her or his ancestors. Even considering a population without genetic structure, say that of suns, it is outlandish to suppose that a sun containing heavy elements could have been, but was not, formed before the supernovas which gave rise to those elements. There is no possibility that birth can be considered a uniformly random selection process: the probability that any of us should be born significantly far away in the past, or future, is simply zero, given evolutionary theory and elementary facts about our biology, regardless of the ultimate size of homo sapiens.